Unity has been the dream of all Yemenis throughout history. But realizing this dream was not without pitfalls. In the late 1970s Yemen was in a perilous situation. It was a two-nation state, with a Marxist regime in the southern Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen, and an Arab nationalist government in the northern Yemen Arab Republic. On June 24, 1978, President Ahmed Al Ghashmi was assassinated by a briefcase bomb planted by the socialist party in Aden, South Yemen. The situation in North Yemen was extremely precarious and in anarchy. Two presidents had been assassinated in less than a year, leaving military and civilians confused about who was to be their next leader. The situation was further complicated by left wing movements, grouped together under the National Democratic Front supported by South Yemen trying to overthrow the government in Sana’a in favor of Aden. Saleh, then a lieutenant colonel, was the military leader of Taiz governorate. He received a radio message saying that an explosion that had taken place at military headquarters in Sana’a. But news about the murder of the President had not been released. Army Chief of Staff Ali Shaybah was flying to Taiz that day to give medals to officers and soldiers in a military camp, but just before landing the pilot of the plane received orders to return to Sana’a. I convinced him to land in Taiz so that I could fly back to Sana’a said Saleh. When the plane landed in Sana’a, explains Saleh, I was cautious because I had expected a coup detat and the airport to be under siege. Instead everything appeared normal. I decided to go on my own to a military camp near the airport, without telling anyone not even my bodyguards. When I got there I discovered 30 to 40 tanks heading towards the city. Saleh knew the officer in charge. Unaware of the Presidents death, the officer told Saleh that the Presidents brother had ordered him to go to Sana’a and start shooting. I asked, who are you planning to shoot in Sana’ a He did not know. He was simply following orders, said Saleh. Because of my good relationship with the tank corps, I was able to take charge and make my first decision to stop the tanks from entering Sana’a. One of the officers told me that there was an official meeting being held at the army headquarters. So I contacted the officials at the meeting and was invited to attend.Present at the meeting were the President of the Peoples Assembly Abdul Kiarim Al - Arshi, Prime Minister Abdul Aziz Abdul Ghani, Army Chief of Staff Ali Shaybah and other top ranking Army staff.
Saleh learnt of the president’s death and recommended the presidency to Prime Minister Abdul Ghani, who declined it, as did other members, including Al Arshi.They decided to create a Provisional Presidential Council (PPC) composed of Al-Arshi, who was to be acting president, Abdul Ghani, Ali Shaybah and Saleh. The situation in Yemen was critical. Military movements were intensifying on the borders of North and South Yemen. A propaganda war was raging and police officers were pressuring Saleh to be the next president. They threatened to arrest all the members of the PPC and to mount a coup if he did not accept. Saleh firmly argued against the coup, saying that the Peoples Assembly must choose the president. This opportunity of a lifetime to fulfill his dream and the dreams of all Yemenis could also have been the end of Saleh’s political career. Instead it was to be the start of the lonely, long and difficult road to unifying his people and their country. Saleh was the only person willing to take the dangerous decision and risk his life. So the PPC was dissolved on July 17, 1978, and the Peoples Assembly elected Saleh to be President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, making it also the first time since the 1962 revolution that a Head of State had been elected within a legal framework. Commenting on the events, Newsweek, declared The new North Yemeni Head of State has six months at best This young, hesitant, 36-year-old officer of humble origins from a small village in the Sana'a Governorate, and who had never been part of traditional circles of leadership, was facing an enormous challenge. Eight months later fighting broke out between North and South Yemen. South Yemen believed it was the right time to impose Socialist unity based on Marxist ideology. The South Yemeni army broke through the weak northern army and occupied Al Baida, Kaataba and Harib. The conflict was short lived. The Arab League froze the membership of South Yemen following a complaint by North Yemen and a delegation was sent to mediate. The Arab League met in Kuwait on March 4, 1979, and ordered both sides to withdraw within ten days and respect each others autonomy. Saleh’s decision to involve the Arab League displayed his strength, and reinforced his rule. On March 30, 1979, Saleh, at the head of a North Yemen delegation, went to Kuwait for a meeting with his southern counterpart, Abdul Fattah Ismail. Later Saleh said, It was clear from the first moment that the socialist party had their own agenda in mind . Having occupied the northern territory, they were sure that North Yemen would not agree to their conditions for unity and implied that they would use force if necessary. The northern leadership asked me to oppose the Marxist conditions and to delay any discussions on unity, until we had attained enough time to rebuild ourselves after the turmoil following the assassinations of two presidents explained Saleh. We feared if unity was forcefully imposed by the socialists, war would break out. Both sides were not ready for unity at that time. North and South Yemen leaders agreed to set up committees to draft a constitution within four months for the unified state. When agreed it was to be submitted for approval by the consultative committees of both countries. Saleh appealed to Saudi Arabia for support to increase the North’s military capability to match that of the South. The Saudis approved funding after seeking American approval. (This was obtained after a report by the American Ambassador warned against the dangers of Marxist expansion into North Yemen, and possible threats on their interests in the region). However, because of training problems with the American weaponry which was provided, in spite of opposition from the US and Saudi Arabia, Saleh chose to buy Soviet and Polish arms. Later both sides unsuccessfully attempted to arrange meetings but no agreement could be reached on a suitable time and place. The first proposed location in Sana’a was rejected by the socialists, and some others refused to meet aboard a plane in mid-air, or on a ship, as they felt they were easy targets for external forces opposing Yemeni Unity. In October 1979, a meeting was finally held in Sana’a between Saleh and Ali Nasser Mohammed, the new socialist leader, and a commitment was made to implement earlier agreements on trade and facilitating border crossing. In the early 80s, terrorism and violence was at its peak. The National Front was planting mines and engaging in terrorism in the North. In November 1981, Saleh took the completed draft of the constitution for a unified state to Aden to propose unity once again. He said, If unity is the answer to violence and terrorism, then so be it. But Saleh faced opposition from northern leaders, who interpreted his move as weak and an act of surrender to the communists. They were joined by some conservatives, encouraged by certain neighboring countries, who were hostile to southerners, describing them as Marxist atheists . Unity was again rejected but several other agreements were reached: the creation of a High Supreme Council consisting of both state presidents; the return of Yemenis to their regions; the end to any hostile military or political activities, including media campaigns, and for meetings to be held between the presidents every four months. Various communications, oil refinery, manufacturing and tourism projects were also to be set up. During his visit, Saleh accompanied Ali Nasser to Hadramawt, where he met Ali Salem Al Bidh, a leading socialist party member, who had been alienated by his party for breaking family law. Plans for immediate unity were discussed, but the socialists rejected it as impossible and said that it could only be introduced gradually. We are South you are North. We are a State and you are a State. Not everyone who has tanks can impose unity on the other by force, said Al Bidh.Both interior ministers agreed to smooth the progress of the border crossing between North and South Yemen. This was an important move towards the elimination of psychological barriers between citizens of both countries.
Recognizing the need for a strong political structure to fill the vacuum in the North, Saleh established The Peoples General Congress (PGC) in 1982, bringing together a number of underground parties, to present a united front to counter-balance the socialist partys Marxist ideology in the South. The Supreme Yemeni Council held various short-lived meetings in Sana’a and Aden. The repeated cry for Unity caused friction within the political leadership of the socialist party and the army of South Yemen, and escalated into a bloody civil war in January 1986. Within three days of the confrontations, said Saleh, I received a message from Nasser Mohammed thanking me for not getting involved. Six days later, however, he formally asked me to intervene, and in return, he would announce unity with me immediately. I refused The civil war ended when Ali Nasser Mohammed and several political, and military leaders fled to the North. Saleh said Nasser Mohamed repeated his earlier request, asking him to declare Unity. I said to him we should have done that when you had the authority. Followers of Nasser Mohammed who wanted to carry out military operations in South Yemen, were prevented from doing so. زWe refused to make North Yemen a platform for the promotion of terrorism to the South, even though the socialist leaders in the South were applying the same policies by supporting the National Front against us. the calls for Yemeni unity from North and South got louder. But the socialist party leadership retreated. By the time that Gorbachev came into power in Moscow, the overall situation and living standards in the North had improved: Oil had been discovered, the Marib Dam had been rebuilt; the armed forces were modernized; political life was more stable, and morale had improved. The socialist leadership had traveled to Moscow prior to the Perestroika to meet Mr. Gorbachev. Hoping to obtain economic and military support for South Yemen, they had been unsuccessful. Gorbachev explained to them that the situation had changed and that the Soviet Union could no longer help. Consequently, political speeches and media campaigns by the leadership of the South became softer and more balanced in tone. The socialist leadership in Aden looked towards the Gulf states but, in view of the worldwide collapse of socialism and communism, they were not willing to cooperate. At that time the desire and support for Unity was increasing by the minute. We had the upper hand and our position was stronger, explained Saleh For the first time voices from South Yemen and no members of the socialist party called for unity. The people of the South had seen the development and political stability as well as the good foreign relations enjoyed by the North, where, in addition, conservatives who had violently opposed the South Yemen Marxist regime no longer regarded unity as treason . Saleh, recalling the memorable drive he took on November 29, 1989, from Taiz to Aden, said, I was heading a big delegation of more than 100 citizens from all political and social affiliations from North and South Yemen. People lined all along that road, calling out for unity, and shouting unity slogans. Saleh was received by the socialist party leadership at Karish checkpoint on the North/ South borders, and joined in one vehicle by Ali Al Bidh, Haidar al Attas and Salem Saleh on the way to Aden. The pressure on the socialist party leadership was becoming evident. When we entered Aden, I was greeting and waving to the public, whilst all three men accompanying me in the car remained silent. They were in shock to see the overwhelming support for unity.س The political environment for the socialist party in Aden was extremely precarious and tense. The collapse of socialist regimes worldwide had increased their fear of isolation, since they had failed to take into consideration the changes happening around them, both nationally and internationally. زImmediately upon arrival, we commenced discussions on our proposal for unity, said Saleh. The socialists straight away began to find hurdles. They claimed the Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, would never allow Yemeni unity, and would go as far as arranging the assassination of all those involved in the unification process, including myself. They also stated that several members of the international community were also against unity. I said to the people: Unity must be accomplished at all cost, including our lives, and even if we only get to experience it for just a few days Saleh was supposed to deliver a speech during the Independence Day celebrations at a crowded soccer field in Aden. When he got there, however, his name was not included in the program and, instead, the President of the south gave a speech making no reference to unity. The celebrations ended peacefully and a meeting was held between delegations from north and south. Saleh gave his intended speech and recommended the draft constitution for unity for approval. After continual persuasion by Saleh the speech was also broadcast by radio from Sana’a and Aden. The next day, another meeting was held at the socialist party headquarters. Saleh shocked party members when he disclosed the real purpose of his visit - to announce unity. Saleh also threatened to resign and remain in Aden if unity was rejected and warned party members of a similar fate to that of Ceacescu if they failed to accept his proposal. Al Bidh repeated the socialist party’s fears for Salehصs life. He said if anything happened to Saleh, war could break out between North and South Yemen, or their neighbors. It was clear the socialists did not want unity, even though they were aware of the growing support for unity amongst the people. That afternoon, however, Saleh met Al Bidh at his home for a private Qat* chewing discussion. During the meeting, Al Bidh told Saleh of plans for his assassination prepared by fundamentalists and tribes in the north, in an effort to alarm him further. I assured him that everything was under control, and persisted in demanding his approval, and declaration of unity said Saleh. Al Bidh emphasizing the difference between the population of the North - 12 million, and the South - 2 million, was concerned about the socialist leadership being replaced by former leader Ali Nasser Mohammed, once unity was certain. I asked him to forget about the past, and concentrate on uniting all the people at all costs, under a United Yemen said Saleh. Saleh also recommended the merger of the two governments, emphasizing there were three times as many government employees in the south as in the north. To attract the socialist party further, he offered them several key positions in the new government including the posts of vice-President, Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Oil. Al Bidh implied that an agreement offering him individual benefits was expected in exchange for any future partnership. I explained that he was entitled to the same privileges and rights as the President said Saleh. Finally, both men agreed to sign the united constitution and to refer it to parliament for approval. Al Bidh called party members to an emergency meeting on the agreement. Tensions rose amongst the divided socialists, one member threatening to kill all present if the agreement was approved. In this critical situation, two men were sent to convince Saleh to allow more time for a decision. They asked me to delay the signing for the following morning. They told me the hall was not available and even sent Sheikh Cenan Abu Lohoum, a member of my own delegation, to convince me to delay. Saleh refused, replying angrily, زEither we sign tonight, or I leave to Taiz and publicly disclose to the people the reality of the situation as it stands. I had arranged for all international agencies and members of the Arab and international media to witness the signing of the unity agreement that evening, . Al Bidh tried to convince his party to support unity, emphasizing the weak position they were in with the collapse of socialism worldwide, the growing support for unity, and talked of the stronger role and privileges offered to them by the new government. The historic agreement of Aden, as it came to be known, was finally signed on the eve of November 30 1989. When the people found out the unity agreement was signed, they went out on all the streets of Yemen in parades bigger than weddings, full of excitement and joy, recalls Saleh. Speaking to the people in Taiz the following day, Saleh asked them to forgive and forget the past. He said Unity does not imply a takeover; therefore, there can be no winners or losers. Saleh was received by an overwhelming reception in Sana’a, with people carrying him on their shoulders through crowds of thousands. The peopleصs reaction on its own was a strong political signal, proving the contrary to what was feared and anticipated by the socialists, that I would be assassinated. It was bigger and greater than I had ever expected, said Saleh.The various agreements between the two countries were initiated. However, the one-year delay before unification became a concern to the people, as they feared that unforeseen events might prevent unity from being fully established.
At a press conference in Sana’a, on December 24, 1989, Ali Salem Al Bidh and Saleh agreed to have regular meetings on past agreements and constitutional amendments, and to issue a referendum on the constitution - once approved by parliament and the Shura council, and for the council of ministers of both countries to set up joint ministries and agencies, as well as new election laws. An amnesty was also issued to Yemenis previously involved in anti-unity activities. In January 1990, the leadership of both governments agreed to give freedom of action to all political and social groups. The socialist party was to maintain its position in the south and the Peoples General Congress in the north. Al Bidh was once again invited to meet in Taiz to agree to establish unity in six months rather than a year. I told him you warned me of the dangers facing us and unity so why not speed the process up said Saleh. Later Al Bidh came to Sana’a and was warmly received by the press which published his picture for the first time. He gave an emotional speech, going beyond the words prepared by his party. Saleh, once again, tried to convince him of the need for immediate unity. On January 22, 1989, Saleh was invited to the U.S. by President Bush. During discussions, Bush asked Saleh: how can you achieve unity with the Marxists in the south who are enlisted as terrorists Saleh replied: I guarantee that all kinds of terrorism from the regime in South Yemen will end when we announce unity. But if we remain two separate countries I cannot guarantee the end of terrorism. Unity alone can put an end to terrorism. The successful outcome of Saleh’s visit to the US was that he gained Bushs support and American commitment for unity in Yemen, putting more pressure for unification on the leadership in Yemen. Later the two leaders met and agreed unification before the planned period of one year. However, the date remained a secret. The two leaders also began discussing the allocation of posts and strategies for unity. Proceedings began to move faster at all levels. An audit was to be done of all private and public properties and assets of both countries (including the Presidentصs residences in the north). A meeting was also held in Taiz between the two prime ministers, and decisions were made to merge public institutions, including the central banks and national airlines, as well as the customs, taxes, ports, communication, information, and telecommunication networks of the two countries. Both finance ministers were to prepare a joint budget for the year 1991, as well as organize a meeting for March, 1990, to follow up on the mergers of ministries, the creation of the national emblem and the composing of a national anthem. An agreement between North and South was finally reached, and in Aden on May 22, 1990, Saleh raised the flag of the new Independent Republic of Yemen. The Republic of Yemen was governed by a Presidential Council consisting of five members for a transitional period up to the first multi-party elections to be held in two years and six months. The President and Vice-President were elected at their first meeting, and the parliament consisted of all the Shura Council members and the People Assembly. Some 98% of the voters in the May 15, 1991 referendum voted in favor of the constitution, the first article of which states the Republic of Yemen is a sovereign and independent state. It is indivisible and inalienable. The Yemeni people are an integral part of the Arab nation and the Islamic world. The October 1991 law encouraged more than 46 projects for the formation of parties and contributed to the electoral law bill approved on June 8, 1992. This bill established the principles of universal suffrage. Men and women were soon able to stand or vote in the 301 parliamentary constituencies. But things were not working out smoothly. Many of the countrys financial problems had been inherited from the Marxist regime in the South, which had run up a bill of some $6.5 billion in arms purchases from the Soviet Union. Under the pretext of punishing Yemen for its stance in the Gulf crisis, Saudi Arabia expelled more than a million workers, increasing the Yemeni population by eight percent and worsening the countrys financial situation. Fate also added a dark period of floods, and droughts. A few months after the elections were finally held on April 27, 1993, and were declared free and fair by international observers. The YSP came in third after the PGC and Islah. Despite losing, Al-Bidh, who wanted to keep his partys posts and privileges, launched a vicious attack on the government. Al-Bidh began to stir up discontent against unity, saying that the South was the loser from measures taken by the central government. In May 1994 his followers launched attacks against government troops, and the army, encouraged and supported by the people, marched on Aden to safeguard unity and e-establish law and order. On May 21 Al-Bidh pronounced himself president of the new Yemen Democratic Republic, and skeptical supporters started deserting. On July 7, 1994, the government announced an end to the rebellion, which had caused damage of some $11 billion. Al-Bidh fled to exile in Oman reportedly with several million dollars in cash. So after years of conflicts, almost unending negotiations, promising rays of sunshine followed by dashed hopes, Yemen’s people finally were united and now share in a democratic process unique in the Arabian Peninsula. Unity has undeniably created a new atmosphere and mentality in Yemen bringing stabilty and economic growth. The introduction of a multi-party system and democratization could have been interpreted as a serious error in a country with no tradition of universal suffrage, challenged by problems of tribalism, illiteracy and religious conservatism and facing considerable interference from external and internal opposition.Nevertheless, one of the world’s oldest nations has been led by the determination, courage and persistence of its President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, towards a modern era where the brotherhood of traditional society will surely be a key factor in promoting peace and eventually economic prosperity.
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